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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act2 (“ESA”) celebrated its 25th anniversary on December 28, 1998.

The Act was passed overwhelmingly by a Congress that sought to protect such creatures as the bald
eagle. However, the Act is under renewed attack as private landowners, incensed by government
control of their property, seek to have portions of the Act declared unconstitutional.
The constitutional basis for many environmental statutes, including the ESA, is the Commerce
Clause, which grants Congress the authority to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce.3 This
clause has historically been broadly construed until the recent Supreme Court decision of United
States v. Lopez.4 The Lopez decision narrowed the reach of the Commerce Clause by requiring
Congress to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce in order for federal laws to withstand
constitutional attack.5
The ESA’s application to isolated species is ripe for constitutional challenge. Isolated species
are those which are indigenous to a specific geographic region, and are nonmigratory. Opponents may
argue that these species cannot have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce if they are not moving
across state lines. A recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Wilson,6 rejected the
application of the Clean Water Act7 (“CWA”) to an isolated wetland for lack of a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.8 In contrast, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
recently upheld application of the ESA to an isolated species in National Association of Home

2

Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
4
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5
Id. at 559.
6
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
7
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
8
Wilson, 133 F.3d at 258.
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Builders v. Babbitt.9 Unfortunately, the value of this decision as precedent remains to be seen, since
the two judges in the majority failed to agree upon a rationale under Commerce Clause authority, and
the third judge dissented.
This Note discusses whether the ESA should apply to isolated endangered species, after
Lopez’s limitation on congressional Commerce Clause power. Section II outlines the relevant
provisions of the ESA. Section III then reviews the history of the Commerce Clause, including Lopez.
Section IV summarizes Commerce Clause jurisprudence in environmental legislation before and after
Lopez. Section V discusses federal jurisdiction over isolated species and the “take by habitat
modification” provision. Finally, section VI provides an analysis of why Congress can and should
regulate isolated species under the ESA. 10

II.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act was enacted by Congress in 1973 as a vehicle for conserving

endangered and threatened species and their ecosystems.11 The goal of the Act was not only to prevent
the extinction of animal and plant species caused by man’s influence on their ecosystems, but also to
restore the species as viable components of their ecosystems.12 The ESA reflects congressional
recognition of the multitude of benefits of species preservation. Congress stated that the ESA was
necessary because “fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,

9

National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
But see David A. Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer
Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
365, 366 (1998) (arguing that Congress does not have the power to regulate isolated species under the
Endangered Species Act).
11
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994); see also Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 F. Supp. 738 (D.
Idaho 1996) (noting that the Endangered Species Act “is a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at
conserving endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems on which they depend”); Palila v.
Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Haw. 1986) (arguing that
one of the main purposes of the Endangered Species Act was to conserve and preserve ecosystems
upon which endangered species depend).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453.
10
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recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”13 Congress had the authority to enact the
ESA under the Commerce Clause, because of the link between these values and interstate commerce.14
The 1973 Act repealed the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969,15 broadened
federal responsibilities to list species, and increased federal authorization and programs to ensure their
survival.16 The impetus for the renewed Act was congressional concern about rapidly deteriorating fish,
wildlife and plant habitats, the indiscriminate utilization of plants and animals, and the increasing numbers
of species threatened with extinction.17 Congress expressed concern not only about hunting and direct
destruction or exploitation of endangered species, but also development, which destroys habitats and
leads to the extinction of species.18 Because of economic growth, various species had already become
extinct and other species were rapidly decreasing in numbers and in danger of extinction. 19
To implement the ESA section 4 directs the Secretary of Commerce or Interior to establish a
list of species determined to be “endangered” or “threatened,” and to designate the critical habitat of the
species, based upon the best scientific data available.20 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)
now lists 1,217 endangered and threatened plants and animals in the United States alone.21 The
Secretary must also describe activities, in the Secretary’s opinion, which would adversely affect such
habitat. Furthermore, section 7(a)(2) requires all federal agencies to work with the Secretary to ensure
that their activities will not “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
13

16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
John C. Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 174, 184-86 (1998).
15
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed
1973).
16
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 3.
17
Id.
18
Craig Anthony Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the
Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1991).
19
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(a)(1), (2) (1994); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1979)
(stating that the plain intent of Congress, in enacting the ESA, was to halt and reverse the trend towards
species extinction, whatever the cost).
20
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
21
Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Listings and Recovery Plans for
Endangered and Threatened Species (last modified Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.fws.gov/
14
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species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary,” to be critical. 22
Even though the ESA is a federal regulatory scheme, certain provisions of the Act have
significant state and local effects. The provision thought to be most susceptible to invalidation on
Commerce Clause grounds is section 9(a)(1)(B). Section 9 specifically forbids any person from
“taking” endangered species.23 “Persons” include private individuals and entities, as well as federal,
state, and local, governments and officials.24 The ESA defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”25 The
FWS by regulation further defines “harm” to mean an act “which actually kills or injures wildlife.”26
Such acts include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”27 This
regulation is commonly referred to as the “take by habitat modification” provision. It is this provision
which is heavily criticized as an encroachment on private land development rights.28
To lessen the impact, section 10(a) offers private landowners the opportunity to carry out a
project by obtaining an incidental take permit. If a developer wants to build in an area inhabited by an
endangered species, and the action may result in the incidental taking of that species, the developer must
submit a comprehensive habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) to the FWS to obtain an incidental take
permit.29 The FWS scrutinizes the plan and hears public comment. The FWS will issue a permit if: (1)
the taking will be incidental to an otherwise lawful activity; (2) the applicant will minimize and mitigate
r9endspp/boxscore.html>. For a complete listing of all the endangered and threatened wildlife, please
see 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1999).
22
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
23
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
24
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
25
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
26
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999).
27
Id.
28
Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49
STAN. L. REV. 305, 306-15, (1997); see also Arnold, supra note 18, at 2, 7-13; Landowners Equal
Treatment Act: Hearings on H.R. 1142 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 60
(1999) (testimony of Nancie G. Marzulla, Defenders of Property Rights); Frances C. James, Lessons
Learned From a Study of Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 BIOSCIENCE 871 (1999).
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the impacts of the taking; (3) there will be adequate funding for the conservation plan, and; (4) the
taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of species survival.30
Even though, land use has historically been a matter of local control,31 sections 9 and 10 grant
the federal government extensive authority over private land use. Since almost 80% of all protected
species have some or all of their habitat on privately owned land,32 the federal government’s influence
over local land use is immense. This growing influence under the authority of statutes like the ESA has
been referred to by scholars as the “quiet federalization” of land use.33 Further, the government
influence is reinforced by the Act’s strict penalties. For example, the penalties for violating section
9(a)(1)(B), as set out in section 11, include criminal penalties of a fine up to $50,000, and imprisonment
for one year.34

III.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER

A. History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution creates a federal government of
enumerated powers.35 James Madison stated that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.”36 This scheme was adopted to ensure the protection of our
fundamental liberties and reduce the risk of tyranny.37 The tripartite structure of the federal government
prevents the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, and similarly, a healthy balance of

29

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1985).
31
Arnold, supra note 18, at 2.
32
James, supra note 28, at 871.
33
Arnold, supra note 18, at 3 (citing F. BOSSELMAN ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION
(1977)).
34
16 U.S.C. § 1540(b).
35
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
36
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37
United States v. Lopez, 541 U.S. 549, 552 (1995)
30
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power between state and the federal government reduces the risk of tyranny from both. It is this tension
between federal and state power that ensures the promise of liberty. 38
Under this structure, Congress has been delegated the enumerated power “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”39 Throughout the history of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, courts struggled to define “commerce.” Nevertheless, this power
became “one of the most prolific sources of national power.”40
To understand Commerce Clause power today, one must look at the early decisions
interpreting the Clause, beginning in 1824 with Gibbons v. Odgen, which gave rise to the “effects
doctrine.” 41 In Gibbons, the Court held that Congress had not only the power to regulate interstate
commerce but also the power to regulate intrastate activities that affected interstate commerce.42 Justice
Marshall held that only activities “which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect
other States,” fall outside the Commerce Clause power.43 This principle was followed in Houston East
& West Texas Railway v. United States, where the Court allowed Congress to set intrastate railway
rates, because the rates had a negative impact on interstate commerce.44 The Court held that the
intrastate rates had “a close and substantial relation” to interstate traffic.45
The protection of public morals also became possible via the Commerce Clause. For instance,
Champion v. Ames gave rise to the “bar doctrine” when it upheld the Federal Lottery Act of 1895
which proscribed the transportation of lottery tickets interstate. 46 Justice Harlan, writing for the
majority, held that Congress’s power included the power to prohibit items from moving within the flow
of commerce.47

38

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
40
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949).
41
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
42
Id. at 186-98.
43
Id. at 195.
44
Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 355 (1914).
45
Id.
46
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
47
Id. at 362-63.
39
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A more restrictive view of the Commerce Clause was seen in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, which held that once an article was no longer in the stream of commerce, Congress
may not regulate it.48 The Court distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” effects. Activities that
affected interstate commerce directly were within Congress’s power; and activities that affected
interstate commerce indirectly were beyond Congress’s reach. 49 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
distinguished between production and commerce, holding that there was no direct relation between the
two, even though the goods produced would later move across state lines.50
Expansion of the Commerce Clause power returned in 1937, with the decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.51 The Court held that Congress could regulate labor relations, when a
labor stoppage of intrastate manufacturing operations would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.52 The Court abandoned prior distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” effects on
interstate commerce;53 and rejected precedent which would not allow regulation in areas commonly left
to state control, such as production and manufacturing. 54
United States v. Darby also upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set minimum wage
and maximum hours for employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce.55 The
Court held that, while manufacturing was not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured
goods was such commerce; and the prohibition of its shipment was a regulation of commerce. The
Court stated that “[t]he power to regulate commerce is the power ‘to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed.’ ”56
The peak of Commerce Clause power was in 1942 with the decision in Wickard v. Filburn.57
The holding in Wickard allowed Congress to regulate the amount of wheat an individual farmer could

48

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 544-47.
50
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936).
51
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
52
Id.
53
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 294 U.S. at 544-47.
54
Carter, 298 U.S. at 304; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
55
United States. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
56
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
57
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
49
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raise under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, by looking at the “cumulative effects” of home
produced wheat on the sales of wheat in commerce.58 The Court held “that [an individual’s] own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”59 Wickard marked the Court’s
adoption of the cumulative effects doctrine.
Social issues were again regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause in 1964. In Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. U.S., the congressional statute which guaranteed equal access to public places
survived a Commerce Clause challenge.60 The Court held that only a “rational basis” was required for
Congress to find that discrimination placed a burden upon interstate commerce.61 In Katzenbach v.
McClung, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was similarly held not to violate the Constitution by imposing the
legislation on a restaurant whose interstate activities were limited to the purchase of out-of-state beef. 62
The decreased spending arising from a refusal to serve blacks was found to have a close-enough
connection to interstate commerce.63
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause was very broad throughout much of this
century. The “effects doctrine,” the “bar doctrine,” the “cumulative effects doctrine,” and the “rational
basis doctrine” allowed Congress to regulate activities very expansively. As subsection B, infra,
explains, Lopez demonstrably limited this expansive power.

B. United States v. Lopez
For the first time in over sixty years, the Supreme Court declined to further extend Congress’s
Commerce Clause power in United States v. Lopez.64 Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was a twelfth grade student
who was convicted of possessing a firearm in a school zone in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones

58

Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 127-28.
60
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
61
Id. at 252-53, 258.
62
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964).
63
Id. at 304.
64
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
59
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Act of 1990 (“Gun-Free Act”).65 Under the Gun-Free Act, Congress made it a federal offense for “any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone.”66 The Court held in a five-to-four decision that the possession of a firearm
in a school zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce and exceeded the authority of Congress
“[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States . . . .”67 Thus, the Court departed from the
rational basis standard traditionally employed in Commerce Clause cases.68

1. Majority And Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion for the Court and Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justices Kennedy and Thomas filed concurring opinions.
According to the majority, the Gun-Free Act neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.69 Following the lead
in Maryland v. Wirtz, which reaffirmed that “the power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed,
has limits,”70 the Court identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power.”71 First, Congress can regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.72
Second, Congress can regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come from intrastate activities.73 Third,
Congress can regulate those activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.74
65

Id.
Id. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)).
67
Id. at 551.
68
Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
69
Id. at 551.
70
Id. at 557 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968), holding that the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under a statute is of no consequence, only when the general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce).
71
Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
72
Id. (citations omitted). “ ‘[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce
free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’ ”
Id. (citation omitted).
73
Id. (citations omitted).
74
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
66
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The Court determined that only the third category applied in Lopez’s case and defined three
areas of inquiry to determine whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce:
1) whether the statute controls a commercial activity, or an activity necessary to the regulation of some
commercial activity; 2) whether the statute contains a jurisdictional nexus requirement, which would
ensure that the activity in question affects interstate commerce; and 3) whether the rationale to uphold
the statute has a logical stopping point.75
The Lopez majority held that the Gun-Free Act failed each of these three “substantial effects”
tests. First, the Court found that Section 922(q) was a criminal statute that had no relation to
“‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise” and was not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity.76 Thus, the activity sought to be regulated—possession of a gun in a local school
zone—was not sufficiently connected to a commercial transaction, and hence, could not substantially
affect interstate commerce. The Court even distinguished the holding in Wickard as being sufficiently
connected to an economic activity, since the consumption of home-grown wheat competed with wheat
in commerce.77
Second, the Gun-Free Act failed because it lacked a jurisdictional element through which a
case-by-case inquiry could establish the requisite nexus between the firearm possession in question and
interstate commerce.78 Congress could not regulate mere possession of firearms, without finding a
connection to interstate commerce. The government’s failure to establish a substantial connection was
echoed in the legislative history. The Court noted that, “the Government concede[d] that ‘[n]either the
statute nor its legislative history contain[ed] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone.’”79
The government had argued that gun possession in school zones could result in violent crimes
which would affect interstate commerce by increasing the “costs of crime,” and thereby raise insurance

75

Id. at 559-65.
Id. at 561.
77
Id. at 560-61 (“Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a
school zone does not.”).
78
Id. at 561.
79
Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
76
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rates. Violent crime could also affect people’s decisions to travel, based upon their perception of the
amount of crime in a given area. Finally, the presence of guns in schools might threaten the educational
process by tainting the learning environment. In turn, this could reduce the productivity of citizens,
which would have an adverse affect on the economic well-being of the nation.80 The Court rejected
these “costs of crime” and “national productivity” reasonings as having no logical stopping point:
=XT
. . . [I]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.
Thus if we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.81
Because mere possession of a gun in a school zone did not by itself have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the Gun-Free Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
Additionally, the Court sought to reaffirm the distinction of “what is truly national and what is truly local,”
which implied that the Commerce Clause should also be limited by concepts of federalism and state
sovereignty.82
The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, in which Justice O’Connor joined, placed more
emphasis on these federalism concerns. When the activity sought to be regulated is non-commercial in
nature, Kennedy would evaluate whether the regulation enters an area traditionally regulated by the
states. Justice Kennedy was concerned that if the federal government regulated entire areas of
traditional state concern, having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, “the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
would become illusory.”83 Since the Gun Free Act was not regulating a commercial activity and entered
an area traditionally of state concern, education and crime, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor joined in
the Court’s holding.84

80

Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.
82
Id. at 567.
83
Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
84
Id. at 568.
81
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Justice Thomas would limit Congress’s Commerce Clause power even further. In his
concurrence, he warned that the “substantial effects” test is still too broad. Justice Thomas was “aware
of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as
sweepingly as does our substantial effects test.”85 He advocated a return to the “original understanding
of the Commerce Clause.”86

2. The Dissent
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer filed dissenting opinions, and Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg joined in Justice Breyer’s opinion. Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that gun possession was not a commercial activity. He reasoned that guns were both articles of
commerce and articles that could be used to restrain commerce, and that their possession was the
consequence of commercial activity.87 Justice Souter felt the majority took “a backward glance” to the
jurisprudence of the past sixty years.88 He objected to the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial activities as creating the same problems which led the Court to reject the distinction
between direct and indirect effects.89
Justice Breyer based his dissent on three principles. First, that the power to regulate commerce
included the power to regulate local activities so long as they significantly affected interstate
commerce.90 Second, that a court should consider not just the effect of a single act, but also its
cumulative effects.91 Third, that the Constitution mandates that courts defer to congressional findings,
both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power to Congress and because the

85

Id. at 596.
Id. at 601.
87
Id. at 602-03.
88
Id. at 608.
89
“The distinction between what is patently commercial and what is not looks much like the old
distinction between what directly affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly.” Id.
“...[T]oday’s decision may be seen as only a misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions not quite in gear
with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case.” Id. at 614-15.
90
Id. at 615.
91
Id. at 616.
86
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determination requires “empirical judgment” more properly left to the legislature.92 Justice Breyer
determined that Congress could have rationally found, based upon reports and hearings, that “violent
crime in school zones,” through its effect on the “quality of education,” significantly affects “interstate
commerce.”93
Justice Breyer cited three legal problems that the majority opinion created. First, the holding
was contrary to modern Supreme Court cases that upheld congressional actions, despite indirect
connections to interstate commerce, that were less significant than the effect of school violence.94
Second, the majority’s holding was irreconcilable from its holdings with earlier cases by making the
critical distinction between “commercial” and non-commercial “transactions[s].”95 Despite the
distinction, Justice Breyer felt that education would fall on the commercial side of the line.96 The final
legal problem he identified was that the holding created legal uncertainty in an area of law that seemed
reasonably well-settled.97

3. The Modern Understanding
Several basic rules may be drawn from the Lopez decision. First, Congress can regulate three
categories of activity: (1) the use of the channels of commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of commerce;
and (3) activities that substantially affect commerce.98 Additionally, Lopez reaffirmed Wickard
concerning Congress’s ability to regulate a purely intrastate activity if it is part of a class of activities that,
taken as a whole, has a substantial “cumulative effect” on interstate commerce.99 However, there are

92

Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 618-19.
94
Id. at 625.
95
Id. at 627 (citations omitted). “[T]his approach fails to heed this Court’s earlier warning not to turn
‘questions of the power of Congress’s upon ‘formula[s]’ that would give ‘controlling force to
nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the
activity in question upon interstate commerce.’” Id. at 627-28 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 120 (1942)). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629.
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Id. at 630.
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Id. at 558-59.
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Id. at 560-61; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
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suggestions in Lopez that Congress will be granted less deference when regulating activities that are not
commercial100 or areas of traditional state concern. 101 Nevertheless, “[t]he court must defer to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for
such a finding.”102
The value of Lopez as precedent to future Commerce Clause challenges is clearly uncertain. 103
Lopez was a five-to-four decision, generating six different legal opinions. The Lopez majority did not
reverse the past sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In fact, Justice Thomas warned that
consideration of stare decisis prevented such a result.104 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor believe the
Commerce Clause could regulate noncommercial activities having a nexus to interstate commerce, so
long as the regulation does not impinge upon state sovereignty.105 Thus, the majority’s return to a
commercial/noncommercial distinction may not withstand the tests of time. Perhaps the Court was
simply not willing or ready to further extend the Commerce Clause into the areas of crime and
education, areas that traditionally have been regulated by the states.106 When the Court was ready to
regulate racial relations, it had no problem extending the Commerce Clause to attain that end.107

100

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 552-53.
102
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); see also Gibbs
v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (“Even after Lopez placed limits on the
Commerce Clause as a grant of Congressional authority, a reviewing court need only determine
‘whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity’ substantially affects interstate
commerce.” (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557)).
103
Nagle, supra note 14, at 176 (“Whether Lopez marks a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence or is instead destined to be a ‘but see’ citation remains to be seen.”).
104
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 n.8 (“Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I
recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the
past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot
wipe the slate clean.”).
105
Id. at 568-83.
106
Id. at 564; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 828-29
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Brzonkala v. Morrison, 144 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1999), and cert.
dismissed sub nom. United States v. Morrison, No. 99-5, 99-29 (R46-018), 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2518,
at *1 (Apr. 5, 2000); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 795-97 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 47 (1997).
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IV.

COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION

A. Before Lopez
Over the past twenty-five years, Congress has enacted numerous laws pursuant to the
Commerce Clause to protect the environment and natural resources. For example, Congress can
regulate pollution under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,108 manage and dispose of
hazardous wastes under the Recourse Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 109 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),110 protect
water quality under the CWA,111 protect air quality under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),112 and protect
endangered species under the ESA. 113
Prior to Lopez, the Court granted the traditional broad deference to Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority when interpreting environmental legislation. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n., Congress prohibited surface coal miners from mining private land except with a
permit in accordance with the standards of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.114 The

107

See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
109
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
110
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). Under CERCLA, whenever a spill or release of a hazardous
substance occurs on private land, the owners of the land, as well as former owners, transporters, and
disposers of the hazardous waste, can be held liable for the entire cost of clean up. Id.
111
See supra note 7.
112
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
113
See supra note 2.
114
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
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Court held that the Act did not violate the Commerce Clause as regulating the use of private lands. The
Court reasoned that it must defer to congressional findings that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there was a rational basis for the finding.115 The congressional findings were that (1)
surface coal mining had a substantial effect on interstate commerce; (2) coal was an article of
commerce; and (3) Congress could have rationally concluded that the reclamation standards and permit
requirements were necessary to protect interstate commerce in coal. 116 Thus, the commerce power
was found “broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution,
or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.”117
The Endangered Species Act was also construed broadly. In United States v. Billie, the
Endangered Species Act survived a First Amendment freedom of religion challenge and was upheld as
applying to the hunting of the Florida panther by Indians on Seminole reservations.118 The court held
that Indian reservation hunting rights were not absolute when a species, such as the Florida panther, was
in danger of extinction.119 In Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, the
court recognized the judicial deference paid to congressional power under the Commerce Clause, even
in light of the due process limitations of the Fifth Amendment.120 In Delbay, a permit issued for the
importation of a substance derived from endangered species, pursuant to the economic hardship
exception to the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, did not give plaintiffs the right to sell
the substance in interstate commerce in violation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.121 The court
reasoned that if there was a continued market for the substance, it may encourage the illegal taking of
the endangered species to supply the market.122 Thus, the court held that Congress had the power
115

Id. at 276. “‘Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where
the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States,
or with foreign nations.’” Id. at 277 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 282.
118
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
119
Id.
120
Delbay Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637, 645 (D.D.C. 1976).
121
Id. at 642 (“The 1973 Act prohibits not only the importation of endangered species, but also makes
it unlawful to ‘sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce’ an endangered species.”). Id. at
640 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(F)).
122
Id. at 642.
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under the Commerce Clause to exclude from the channels of interstate commerce those products whose
movements between the states Congress deemed harmful to the national welfare.123

B. Post-Lopez Challenges
Ironically, most environmental laws appear to be surviving Commerce Clause attacks in light of
Lopez-based challenges upon findings that the particular activity in question substantially affects
interstate commerce.124 The primary reason is that most of the central provisions of major federal
environmental laws regulate industrial or commercial activity, rather than non-commercial individual
activity.
So far, species protection has fared well since Lopez. In 1996, in United States v. Bramble,
an individual was convicted of possessing eagle feathers and challenged Congress’s authority under the
Bald Eagle Protection Act.125 The court upheld the Act126 against a Commerce Clause challenge,
reasoning that “[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate commerce by foreclosing
any possibility of several types of commercial activity: future commerce in eagles or their parts; further
interstate travel for the purpose of observing or studying eagles; or further commerce in beneficial
products derived either from eagles or from analysis of their genetic material.”127 The court held that
laws governing intrastate activities would be upheld if they regulated a class of activities which
substantially affects interstate commerce.128 The court also held that it was reasonable for Congress to
conclude that the possibility of commercial gain presents a special threat to the preservation of the
eagles because that prospect creates a powerful incentive both to evade the statute, and to take a large
quantity of birds.129
In 1997, Building Industry Association of Superior California v. Babbitt held that the listing
of fairy shrimp as endangered under the ESA did not exceed the federal Commerce Clause power or
123

Id. at 645.
See infra notes 125-142 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996).
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16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994).
127
Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1481.
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Id.
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violate the Tenth Amendment.130 Plaintiffs argued that there was no nexus between the fairy shrimp and
interstate commerce and that the listing interfered with state and local sovereignty over land use, and did
not “substantially affect” interstate commerce as required by Lopez.131 The court distinguished the ESA
from the statute in Lopez as directly and expressly regulating “the import, export and sale of listed
species in interstate commerce.”132 The court looked at congressional legislative history and determined
that species preservation substantially affects the national economic interest.133 Furthermore, the court
found plaintiffs’ position untenable since “[a]ccording to plaintiffs, if a species is abundant and scattered
plentifully across state lines, Congress is fully empowered under the Commerce Clause to protect it.
But when that same species becomes more scarce and its population reduced to a single state,
Congress’s hands are suddenly tied.”134
In 1998, in Gibbs v. Babbitt, plaintiffs sought a declaration that all federal regulations relating to
the taking of red wolves on private land were invalid as exceeding the Tenth Amendment.135 The court
held that the wolves were clearly articles in interstate commerce and had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce due to their tourism value.136 It was irrelevant that the threat to the wolf-related commerce
came from the intrastate takings of wolves.137
However, challenges to some environmental regulations have been successful. In United States
v. Olin Corp.,138 the court invalidated an application of CERCLA requiring the clean-up of a twentyacre solid waste management site because the pollution at that site did not affect interstate commerce.139
In applying Lopez to CERCLA, the court held that Lopez requires that the statute regulate economic
activity which substantially affects commerce and contain a jurisdictional element which ensures that the
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Id. at 1480.
Building Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997).
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Id. at 906.
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Id. at 907.
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Id.
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Id. at 908.
135
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
136
Id. at 535.
137
Id.
138
United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
139
Id. at 1533; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a) (1994).
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statute affects commerce.140 The court found that since the plant being regulated was no longer
operational, it did not qualify as economic.141 The court further held that, despite the fact that CERCLA
did not contain a jurisdictional element, the activity in question had no effect on interstate commerce
since there was no evidence that the contaminants at the site traveled across state lines.142 However,
the CWA has been attacked as an abuse of congressional Commerce Clause power when applied to
isolated wetlands.

C. Attack on Isolated Wetlands
The purpose of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”143 Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for the “discharge of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters.”144 This section has been attacked as an abuse of
congressional Commerce Clause power when applied to isolated wetlands. Isolated wetlands, unlike
adjacent wetlands, have no hydrological connection to any body of water.145 Isolated wetland
regulation has primarily been upheld based on the wetland’s use or potential use as a habitat for
migratory birds.146 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, the court reaffirmed the CWA’s ability to regulate isolated intrastate wetlands that
provide a habitat for migratory birds. The rationale was that the cumulative degradation of intrastate

140

Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. at 1532.
Id. at 1533.
142
Id.
143
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
144
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
145
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir. 1992) (“By their very definition,
isolated wetlands have no relationship or interdependence with any other body of water.”), vacated,
975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992), and amended by 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court has
recognized the importance of regulating waters that together form an “integral part of the aquatic
environment.” United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985).
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See infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
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waters could have a substantial effect on interstate commercial interests relating to those birds.147
Further, in United States v. Hallmark Construction Company, the court held that the regulation of
intrastate isolated wetlands based on their actual or potential use by migratory birds did not exceed
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.148
However, section 404 of the CWA was invalidated as applied to isolated wetlands that did not
provide a habitat for migratory birds in United States v. Wilson.149 In Wilson, the developers were
convicted of knowingly discharging fill material and excavated dirt into wetlands without a permit, in
violation of the CWA.150 The defendants appealed and challenged the authority of the Army Corps of
Engineers’ regulation, which defined waters of the United States to include those waters whose
degradation “could affect” interstate commerce.151
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and held that the regulation required neither
that the regulated activity have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, nor that the covered waters
have any sort of nexus with navigable or interstate waters.152 The court noted that, “[w]ere this

147

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 998 F. Supp. 946, 949-52
(N.D. Ill. 1998) [hereinafter Cook County]; see also Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,
260-61 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the potential use of wetlands by migratory birds was sufficient to
support jurisdiction because “millions of people annually spend more than a billion dollars on hunting,
trapping, and observing migratory birds” and the “cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced populations
of many bird species”).
148
United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998).
149
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
150
Wilson, 133 F.3d at 253.
151
Id. at 255; see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1993). The CWA defines navigable waters as “the waters of
the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). By regulation, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
further defines this to include “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,
or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of ‘which could’ affect interstate or foreign
commerce.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1993). In a preamble to this regulation, the Corps explains that the
term “other waters” includes those which “are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines.” 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov.13, 1986). This is commonly known as the
“migratory bird rule.”
152
Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255
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regulation a statute, duly enacted by Congress, it would present serious constitutional difficulties,
because . . . it would appear to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”153
Thus, under Wilson, if a wetland is truly isolated, meaning that it is neither connected to
navigable waters nor connected to interstate commerce (such as providing a habitat for migratory birds),
Congress cannot regulate it. Similar to isolated wetlands, isolated species are seemingly not connected
to interstate commerce. Because the ESA speaks of the importance of every species, including isolated
ones, the decision in Wilson may lend support for opponents who would like to weaken application of
the ESA’s “take by habitat modification provision” to isolated species having no connections to
interstate commerce.154

V.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ISOLATED SPECIES UNDER THE “TAKE BY
HABITAT” MODIFICATION PROVISION

VI.

A. Before Lopez
Judicial decisions interpreting federal jurisdiction over isolated species under the Commerce
Clause before Lopez are scarce. The most notable case is Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources, where the regulation of an isolated species was upheld.155 Palila was the first case
to deal with the “take by habitant modification” provision of the ESA.156
In Palila, the state of Hawaii was sued for failing to protect the Palila bird population by
refusing to eradicate the feral sheep population that was threatening the critical habitat of the Palila.157
The state challenged application of the ESA to the Palila habitat since the bird neither moved interstate
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Id.
See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
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Id. at 992.
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Id. at 987.
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nor inhabited federal lands.158 However, the court held that the Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Power gave Congress the ability to preempt state control over an endangered species, even when the
species was indigenous to that state:159
=XT
Congress has determined that protection of any endangered species anywhere is of the
utmost importance to mankind, and that the major cause of extinction is destruction of
natural habitat. In this context, a national program to protect and improve the natural
habitats of endangered species preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in
these species and of interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature
or professional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these species, that
would otherwise be lost by state inaction. 160
After Lopez’s enunciation of the “substantial effects” test, one may question the validity of the
holding in Palila. To preserve a species, based upon “the possibilities of interstate commerce” in that
species, by interfering with local land use appears to run afoul of Lopez. Nevertheless, shortly after
Lopez, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in National Association of Home Builders
v. Babbitt, which seemed to address the concern raised in Wilson, but as applied to isolated species.161

B. After Lopez: Home Builders v. Babbitt
Home Builders is a significant victory not only for a rare species of a fly, but also for the
protection of isolated endangered species in general. However, the effect of this decision still remains to
be seen. The three judges on the D.C. Circuit deciding the case offered three different explanations for
why the ESA could or could not protect the fly’s habitat.
The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (“Fly”), was listed as an endangered species in 1993.162
This rare species, belonging to the “mydas flies” family, visits flowers in search of nectar, and pollinates
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Id. at 992.
Id. at 995.
160
Id. at 944-95 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
161
National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 937 (1998) [hereinafter Home Builders].
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Id. at 1044.
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nearby native plants.163 The Fly is truly isolated. There are currently only eleven known populations of
the Fly, all within an eight-mile radius, in the soils of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties,
California.164
This dispute arose when San Bernardino County decided to build a hospital and was forced to
alter its plans because the chosen site was determined by the FWS to contain the Fly’s habitat.165 The
County filed suit when the FWS informed the County that their plan of redesigning a nearby intersection
to improve emergency vehicle access to the hospital would likely constitute a “taking” of the Fly, under
the ESA section 9(a)(1)(B)’s “take by habitat modification” provision. 166
The appellants167 challenged application of section 9(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any
person to “take any [endangered or threatened] species within the United States or the territorial sea of
the United States,”168 to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.169 They argued that the federal
government does not have the authority to regulate the use of nonfederal lands in order to protect the
Fly, which is found only within a single state.170 The district court disagreed and held that the application
of section 9(a)(1) to the Fly was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The
rationale of the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed by a vote of 2 to 1, is summarized below. 171

1. The Majority Opinion
Judge Wald, writing the majority opinion, held that section 9(a)(1) of the ESA was clearly not a
regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of persons or things in interstate
commerce.172 Instead, she upheld the ESA as within Congress’s authority to regulate the use of the
163

Id. at 1043-44.
Id.
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Id. at 1043.
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Id.
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National Association of Home Builders of the United States, the Building Industry Legal Defense
Fund, the County of San Bernardino, and the City of Colton, California. Id.
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16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
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Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1045.
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Id. at 1043.
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Id. at 1046.
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“channels of interstate commerce” and as an activity which “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”
Judge Wald relied upon the first and third categories of activity discussed in Lopez.173
Judge Wald held that the ESA as applied was a proper exercise of Congress’s power over the
channels of interstate commerce for two reasons. First, section 9(a)(1) is necessary to control the
transport of endangered species into interstate commerce.174 Judge Wald analogized that the
prohibition against takings of endangered species was similar to the prohibition against the transfer and
possession of machine guns.175 The prohibition on “taking” endangered species intrastate was
necessary to control interstate trafficking of the endangered species. However, no evidence was
present of trafficking in the Fly.
Second, Judge Wald held that the prohibition against taking endangered species is permitted to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.176 This rationale has
been used before, such as in Heart of Atlanta Hotel, where the Supreme Court upheld the prohibition
on racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, which served interstate travelers, against a
Commerce Clause challenge.177 Congress has the authority to regulate local activities if those activities
might have a substantial and harmful effect upon commerce.178
The court also held that section 9(a)(1) falls under the category of activities that substantially
affects interstate commerce.179 The court reasoned that Congress could rationally conclude that section
9(a)(1) substantially affects interstate commerce by preventing the destruction of biodiversity.
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Id.
Id.
175
Id. at 1047. “By regulating the market in machineguns, including regulating intrastate machinegun
possession, Congress has effectively regulated the interstate trafficking in machineguns.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
176
Id. at 1048. Congress used its authority “to prevent the eradication of an endangered species by a
hospital that is presumably being constructed using materials and people from outside the state and
which will attract employees, patients, and students from both inside and outside the state. Thus, like
regulations preventing racial discrimination or labor exploitation, regulations preventing the taking of
endangered species prohibit interstate actors from using the channels of interstate commerce to
“promote or spread[] evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.” Id. (citations omitted).
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See supra notes 60-61.
178
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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Biodiversity is a term biologists use to describe the number, variability and variety of life on Earth.180
Each time an extinction occurs, the pool of wild species diminishes.181 The court reviewed the legislative
history of the ESA, which reflects the value of preserving genetic diversity and the potential for future
commerce related to or derived from that diversity. 182 The court rationalized that a decrease in
biodiversity would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce because natural resources that could
otherwise be used for commercial resources would be diminished.183
Further, section 9(a)(1) controls the adverse effects of interstate competition that would result
from states lowering endangered species protection standards in order to attract development.184 In
Darby, the Court upheld federal wage and hour laws because “such regulations were necessary to
prevent states with higher regulatory standards from being disadvantaged by states with lower regulatory
standards.”185 This argument has merit, despite the concurring and dissenting opinions to the contrary.
If states were allowed to impose lower environmental regulations, they would unfairly compete with
states that imposed more stringent environmental regulations by attracting and retaining corporate
investment.186

2. Judge Henderson’s Concurrence
Judge Henderson voted to uphold application of the Act on the ground that the potential loss of
biodiversity itself would have a substantial effect on the ecosystems and as a result, interstate
commerce.187 She rationalized that everything in the environment is interconnected and that the loss of
one species, even an intrastate one, would substantially affect interstate commerce. She disagreed with
180

ROGER L. DISILVESTRO, RECLAIMING THE LAST WILD PLACES, A NEW AGENDA FOR
BIODIVERSITY 23-25 (1993).
181
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-54.
182
Id. at 1050-51.
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Id.
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Id. at 1054-56.
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United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
186
This has been termed the “race-to-the-bottom” argument. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977).
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Home Builders, 130 F.3d. at 1058.
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Judge Wald’s theory that an endangered species has a substantial effect on interstate commerce by
virtue of its potential medical or economic value; she wrote that any possible value was too uncertain.188
She also disagreed with Judge Wald that this was a regulation of the use of interstate commerce
channels because the Fly did not move between states either on its own or through human agency.189

3. Judge Sentelle’s Dissent
Judge Sentelle did not agree that Congress can regulate the Fly, which is neither commerce nor
interstate. He reasoned that section 9(a)(1), analogous to the statute in Lopez, does not regulate
commerce.190 He disagreed, as did Judge Henderson, that section 9(a)(1) was a regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce. Judge Sentelle did not agree that a statute which prevents the
destruction of local flies, which are neither articles of commerce nor travelling interstate, is keeping the
channels of commerce free from their interstate transportation.191
Whether or not the activity substantially affected commerce was the only category under Lopez
that Judge Sentelle arguably felt could have permitted Congress to regulate the Fly. However, by
applying the subsidiary inquires of the test enunciated in Lopez, he felt that section 9 did not substantially
affect commerce.192 First, the regulation did not control a commercial activity or an activity necessary to
the regulation of some commercial activity. Second, section 9 did not require that the regulated activity
affect interstate commerce or provide for a jurisdictional nexus. Third, Judge Sentelle felt that section 9
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Id.
Id. at 1057-58. “In support [Judge Wald] cites decisions upholding regulation of commercially
marketable goods, such as machine guns and lumber, and public accommodations. In each case, the
object of regulation was necessarily connected to movement of persons or things interstate and could
therefore be characterized as regulation of the channels of commerce.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Id. at 1062.
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Id. at 1063 (“[P]reventing habitat destruction contributes nothing to the goal of eliminating the fly, or
any other endangered species, from the channels of commerce.”).
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had no logical stopping point.193 Further, he criticized Judge Henderson’s reliance on Wickard v.
Filburn. He stated that Maryland v. Wirtz rejected the expansive reading of Wickard and held that
“‘neither here nor in Wickard has the court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities.’”194
From the unfortunately confusing result in Home Builders we are left to determine whether
future challenges of the ESA’s application to isolated species may be defeated through Lopez’s
limitation to the Commerce Clause.

VII.

ISOLATED ENDANGERED SPECIES SHOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

A. Challenges To Isolated Endangered Species
Opponents to the ESA will argue that when section 9 applies to a purely isolated species, that
species should not be subject to federal control. Their argument, along the lines of Sentelle’s dissent,
will be that isolated species, like isolated wetlands, have no connections to interstate commerce and thus
do not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Clearly, Congress has the authority to regulate the takings of wildlife when they are articles of
commerce.195 However, just because a species is isolated and does not move across state lines, does
not lessen the argument. An irrational distinction would exist if the federal government could regulate the
spotted owl because it is located in Washington, Oregon and California, but not the Palila bird because
it is indigenous to Hawaii. The fact that a species has been listed as endangered or threatened actually
increases the likelihood that the species is found in only one state. Species capable of considerable
193

Id at 1064 (“As I understand her argument, because of some undetermined and indeed
indeterminable possibility that the fly might produce something at some undefined and undetermined
future time which might have some undefined and undeterminable medical value, which in turn might
affect interstate commerce at that imagined future point, Congress can today regulate anything which in
turn might advance the pace at which the endangered species becomes extinct.”).
194
Id. at 1066 (citing Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27). But see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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geographic movement are often not threatened or endangered. The FWS, for example, requires
evidence of geographical isolation and/or genetic differentiation when determining whether a species
should be listed on the basis that it is a distinct population segment.196 Furthermore, almost one-half of
all threatened and endangered species are found in only one state. 197
Isolated species may have just as great an impact on interstate commerce as nonisolated
species. The isolated Malayan pit viper might seem of little importance to developers or commerce.
Yet studies on the venom of one species of these vipers led to the discovery of the angiotensin system
that regulates blood pressure in human beings. Once that system was known it became possible to
devise a molecule that alters blood pressure. This compound, which is the preferred prescription drug
for hypertension, brings the Squibb Company $1.3 billion annually in sales.198 Madagascar, the most
isolated of the great islands of the world,199 is home to the rosy periwinkle, a pink five-petaled flower,
which produces two alkaloids, vinblastine and vincristine, that cure most victims of two of the deadliest
of cancers, Hodgkin’s disease and acute lymphocytice leukemia.200 The income from manufacturing
and selling “these two substances exceeds $180 million per year.”201
Aside from requiring that isolated species have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
Lopez has opened the door to challenging environmental legislation under two additional theories: (1)
that the activity is an area of traditional state concern;202 and (2) that the regulated activity is not
“economic,”203 and, hence, does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
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1. Areas of Traditional State Concern
The regulation of wildlife has historically been at the federal level. Thus, courts will most likely
not hold that the federal government is entering an area of traditional state concern in its regulation of
wildlife. More importantly, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government has the authority to
regulate wildlife.204 However, the “take by habitat modification” provision of section 9 is more
troubling.
Opponents believe this provision, as applied to isolated species, is unconstitutional because of
its impact on local land use, which traditionally is an area of state concern.205 Without this provision,
however, the ESA would be a hollow attempt at species protection. A species habitat is vital to its
viability; and habitat destruction is by far the biggest problem facing endangered species today.206 In
Lopez, the Court determined that the Gun-Free Act was not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity. Section 9, on the other hand, is an essential provision which furthers the main goals
of the ESA, which is to protect threatened and endangered species. Thus, any effect on local land use
is incidental to the main goals of the ESA. Furthermore, the fact that the regulation of a species’ habitat
affects local land is not a prima facie case for a constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause.
Wickard held that incidental local effects did not matter so long as the matter being regulated has an
effect on interstate commerce.207 While section 9 does not aim to regulate local land use, it may
displace local land use regulation, with significant costs to private landowners—costs that may far
exceed any potential benefit from saving a particular listed species.
However, the Act’s prohibition on the taking of species is not absolute, since incidental takings
by agencies or private landowners may be allowed as long as mitigation measures are taken. Thus,
private landowners may be permitted to pursue some economic activity on their land, even though such
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activity may incidentally take a listed species.208 Many incidental take permits are being granted and
development is moving forward.209 For example, in San Bruno, California, in exchange for the permit to
develop certain areas and destroy 14% of the habitat of an endangered butterfly, a substantial area of
privately owned habitat was to be conveyed to the County of San Mateo.210 Similar permits have been
granted in many circumstances across the nation.211
The statute in Lopez also entered an area traditionally left up to the states—education and
criminal law. For the Court, the argument articulated in support of the Gun Free Act in Lopez, that a
poor learning environment would have a substantial effect on commerce, too broadly extended the
Commerce Clause. If left unchecked, Congress could regulate school curriculum or family relations—
as those have as much of a link to commerce as the statute in Lopez.212 In contrast, the ESA’s habitat
modification provision’s effects on a landowner’s rights is the furthest it can go. Not all species will
affect land use, only those species which have been listed as endangered or threatened. As pointed out
by biologists, this number is very small in comparison to the number of species actually inhabiting
Earth.213 Additionally, as discussed supra, a landowner can take an endangered species (and effectively
destroy their habitat) so long as he or she first obtains an incidental take permit.
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2. Economic Activities
Section 9 regulates many activities that also can be challenged as not being economic in nature.
However, even the Lopez majority conceded that any activity could be looked at as commercial. 214
Thus, the economic/noneconomic distinction presents obvious difficulties in application. Nevertheless,
species protection has already been tied to activities which are economic.215 Whether a species has
economic value in drawing tourism,216 in the commercial sale of the species or its parts,217 or in travel
associated with scientific study, Congress has a variety of commercial concerns giving it the
constitutional authority to regulate even isolated species.
When confronted with a species that does not have actual, but only potential, links to
commerce, as in the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly case, the effect on interstate commerce becomes
less apparent. However, habitat modification that occurs incident to commercial development, as seen
in Home Builders, is economic. Problems arise when the private landowner wants to make
improvements to his land and is confronted with a Section 9 violation because the construction will likely
destroy the habitat of an endangered species. This scenario is significantly different from the
construction of the hospital in Home Builders, which is arguably a commercial activity.
A residential landowner building a pool or tennis court on his land, for example, can hardly be
characterized as engaging in commerce. However, as law professor and scholar John Copeland Nagle
points out, it depends on which question you are asking.218 For example, if the test is whether or not the
pool will have a substantial effect on commerce, the answer will most likely be no. Similarly, if one asks
whether an isolated species will have a substantial effect on commerce, the answer will also most likely
be no. However, if one asks the question whether isolated endangered species as a class will have a
substantial effect on commerce, the answer is obviously yes. Thus, the reason for the confusion is that
everyone is asking different questions. If the focus remains on the regulated class of entities—
endangered species—which have already been tied to economic activities, courts may then eliminate the

214

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
See supra note 179.
216
See supra notes 135-137.
217
See supra notes 125, 127-129.
218
See Nagel, supra note 14, at 180-92.
215

Scalero 5-10-00

32

tenuous problem of tying a private individual landowner’s actions to interstate commerce. Thus, the
constitutional analysis should stay focused on the species, not the landowners filing suit.

B. Isolated Species Link to Interstate Commerce Is Found in Biodiversity
Conflicts between humans and other species are inescapable—the homes, buildings, churches,
schools, museums, stadiums, and roads we all use are built on land which species inhabit.219 However,
if the protection of endangered species is seen as the protection of biodiversity, then restrictions which
seem only trivial may finally be understood. Because of the importance of biological and ecosystem
diversity to the well-being of the nation and also interstate commerce, it is appropriate to regulate
endangered species under the Commerce Clause—even isolated ones.220
The term biodiversity encompasses diversity at all levels of organization. Biologists often refer to
biodiversity as the “number, variability, and variety of life on Earth.” 221 Biodiversity is important at three
distinct levels: species diversity; ecosystem or habitat diversity, and finally genetic diversity.222
Paradoxically, the term “biodiversity” symbolizes biologists’ lack of knowledge about the natural
world.223 No one really knows for sure how may species there are, or how many are lost on Earth.
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While the number of species currently described is 1.4 million, current estimates of the total number of
species run from 10 to 100 million. But ignorance about biodiversity may have severe consequences.
Biologists warn of the latent value of undiscovered foods, medicines and industrial products.224 It has
been estimated that less than 5% of the species on earth have been tested for either food or
pharmaceutical potential.225 Biological resources still provide the raw materials for food, most
pharmaceuticals, clothing and shelter. The loss of species and genetic diversity diminishes the pool of
biological resources available for human consumption. Since extinctions are irreversible, the present
losses of diversity will result in future generations inheriting a biologically impoverished world, with
potentially significant social, health and economic consequences.226 Although the National Biological
Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research Act did not pass though Congress, the Act
contained significant findings regarding biodiversity:
=XT
...
(5) reduced biological diversity may have serious consequences for human welfare as
resources for research and agricultural, medicinal, and industrial development are
irretrievably lost;
(6) reduced biological diversity may also endanger the functioning of ecosystems and
critical ecosystem processes that moderate climate, govern nutrient cycles and soil
conservation and production, control pests and diseases, and degrade wastes and
pollutants;
(7) reduced biological diversity will diminish the raw materials available for scientific and
technical advancement, including the development of improved varieties of cultivated
plants and domesticated animals;
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. . . 227
Ensuring a wide genetic base is fundamental to maximizing the utility of biotechnology in
agriculture and medicine.228 For example, in agriculture, genetic resources are critical for improving
crops. Improved breeds of crops derived from a diverse gene pool of wild plants have accounted for
about half of the increase in productivity in U.S. agriculture. Annually these improved crops account for
about $1 billion to U.S. agriculture.229 In medicine, plant and animal species remain an important source
of pharmaceutical ingredients. Plant extracts are used in about 25% of the prescription drugs used in
the United States, with a market value totaling $15 billion annually.230 Discoveries for the advancement
of medicine may constitute one of the most powerful ways biodiversity can contribute to human society.
For example, Penicillium mold at one time was valued for what it did to flavor blue cheeses, but this
later paled in comparison when it lead to the discovery of antibiotics.231 These are only a few examples,
but they clearly show that an isolated species’ contribution to biodiversity can have a “substantial effect”
on interstate commerce.
The legislative proceedings during 1973 for the Endangered Species Act are similarly filled with
expressions of concern over the risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species.232 Congress
was very concerned about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and about the
unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of life on the planet.233 In explaining the need
for legislation, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries stated:
=XT
As we homonogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and as we
increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply. . . we threaten
their—and our own—genetic heritage. The value of this genetic heritage is, quite
literally, incalculable.
227
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...
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to
minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential
resources. They are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers
to questions which we have not yet learned to ask.
...
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer . . . may lie locked up in the
structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? . . . Sheer selfinterest impels us to be cautious. 234
These comments reflect congressional concern for biodiversity, and ultimately the possible benefits that
biodiversity may bring to humanity.

C. Cumulative Effects Doctrine
Even under the strictest application of Lopez, provided one applies Wickard’s cumulative or
aggregate effects doctrine in evaluating section 9 challenges, the economic or substantial effect of any
one species is immaterial. By applying this doctrine to environmental legislation, most statutes will likely
survive a constitutional challenge. Extension of Commerce Clause authority over local activity, where
that activity has minimal or no impact on commerce, is constitutional if, in the aggregate, the class of
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.235 Section 9 takings, through habitat modification by a
private landowner, should be regulated as a class of activities, the regulation of which is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the ESA—the preservation of endangered species.
In enacting the ESA, Congress sought to protect all endangered and threatened species because
“species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
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scientific value to the Nation and its people.”236 All of these utilitarian values have an effect on
commerce—billions of dollars are spent annually on food, tourism, medicine, advances in science, and
so on. Thus, when viewed in the aggregate, the cumulative effects of habitat destruction will likely have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Most environmental statutes are upheld based upon their “cumulative effects.” In the decision
of, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a federal
court reaffirmed the congressional authority to regulate isolated intrastate wetlands providing a habitat
for migratory birds.237 The court held that the cumulative degradation of intrastate waters could have a
substantial effect on interstate commercial interests relating to those birds.238 Under this rationale, it
does not matter whether or not the actual birds themselves substantially affected commerce. In fact, the
destruction of one isolated wetland is not likely to have a substantial effect on commerce; the court
looked to the cumulative effect of intrastate wetland destruction.
Similarly, it may be difficult to prove the effect on interstate commerce of one isolated species
with no apparent ties to economic activity. In fact, if the whooping crane disappeared tomorrow,
society probably would not feel its effects. But if species protection was conducted on a case-by-case
basis, most species would not have a substantial effect on commerce. However, the cumulative effect
of these decisions would have a substantial effect on commerce. Thus, if species protection under the
ESA has any meaning at all, it must be viewed in the aggregate.
When looked at from this perspective, it does not matter if scientists ever traveled to see the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly; or if the Fly traveled between the states; or if the Fly is exhibited in a
museum in another state. These arguments only point to the tenuousness of the links that the Fly has to
commerce. If one looks to the fundamental purpose of the ESA, it is to protect endangered species.
Since all species are necessary for the preservation of biodiversity, a loss of such diversity will
substantially affect interstate commerce.
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Finally, courts should not make value judgments between which species should and should not
be saved.239 Biologists and naturalists would be loath to put into the hands of the courts the ultimate
decision of a particular specie’s effect on agriculture, science, society, and ultimately commerce. Courts
simply are not equipped to make these types of determinations. Judge Sentelle would make such a
determination for the Fly. But it is not the Fly’s demise but the total loss of biodiversity that substantially
affects commerce. Only under this logic can all species be protected—even isolated ones.

VII.

CONCLUSION
Whether Lopez presents a real threat to environmental regulation can only be tested with time.

Nevertheless, even under the broadest reading of Lopez, most of the central provisions of major federal
environmental laws will be upheld based upon principles of stare decisis. Further, because
environmental laws generally regulate commercial activities that are not “areas of traditional state
concern” they will have a greater chance of meeting constitutional muster. Undoubtedly, as provisions
of the Act encroach more and more on private land development rights, the Act’s constitutionality will
continue to be challenged.
Congress may regulate isolated species under the Commerce Clause. The new test for
constitutionality enunciated in Lopez is whether the regulated activity has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce. Additionally, Lopez reaffirmed the holding in Wickard, concerning Congress’s
ability to regulate a purely intrastate activity if it is part of a class of activities that, taken as a whole, has
a substantial “cumulative effect” on interstate commerce.240 The protection of isolated species should be
upheld under the Commerce Clause by applying this rationale. The loss of one species may not be
substantial, but the cumulative effects of the loss of all species, which decreases biodiversity, will have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
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When we chip away at the biodiversity of our planet, we chip away at our potential for knowing
more about, and surviving better in the world. Forgetting about the aesthetic reasons for preservation,
there are pragmatic reasons as well. Even people who have little regard for the spiritual and emotional
benefits of biodiversity protection cannot ignore the fundamental benefits that wild species bring to our
daily lives, such as food, medicine and even jobs. While one species may seem to have no intrinsic
worth whatsoever, its value in terms of biodiversity may well be incalculable.
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